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economists around the country.1 He 
continued to publish his survey every 
six months, gathering and reporting on 
the forecasts and tracking their evolu-
tion over time. His survey, which was 
the only collection of private-sector 
forecasts of macroeconomic variables 
in the country at the time, gained a 
national following. Economic research-
ers began using the survey extensively 
in the early 1970s to test theories 
about people’s expectations. By 1978, 
Livingston was having trouble keep-
ing up with all of the requests for the 
data and turned the data over to the 
Philadelphia Fed’s Research Depart-
ment, which organized the data in a 
computer database and made them 
available to researchers on request. 
Livingston still ran the survey, but the 
Philadelphia Fed compiled the results 
and maintained the database. Living-
ston provided the first report of the 
survey’s results in his column in the 
Philadelphia Inquirer. When Living-
ston died in 1989, the Fed took over 
the administration of the survey and 
carried on Livingston’s legacy. Since 
the advent of the Internet, the Fed has 
made all of the historical Livingston 
data available on its website.2
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The Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia has conducted both 
the Survey of Professional Forecast-
ers and the Livingston Survey for 20 
years. Both surveys of private-sector 
forecasters provide researchers, central 
bankers, news media, and the public 
with detailed forecasts of major macro-
economic variables. The surveys have 
been made available to the public at no 
charge, reflecting the public education 
1 Herb Taylor’s 1992 article describes the survey 
and Livingston’s newspaper columns reporting 
on the survey. For an in-depth discussion of the 
setup of the survey and a description of early 
research using it, see my 1997 article.
2 The Philadelphia Fed’s website (at: www.
philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-
time-center/livingston-survey/) contains back-
ground material about the Livingston Survey, 
news releases from the survey going back to 
1991, data files containing both forecasts of 
individuals and means or medians across the 
forecasters for each variable in each survey, and 
an academic bibliography listing research papers 
that have used the survey.
he Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia has 
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Forecasters and the Livingston Survey for 
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forecasters provide researchers, central bankers, news 
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macroeconomic variables. The surveys have proved 
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mission of the Federal Reserve. The 
surveys have proved helpful for people 
who are planning for the future. They 
have also provided useful input into 
the decisions of policymakers at the 
Federal Reserve and elsewhere.  This 
article will provide an overview of the 
surveys and discuss the ways in which 
researchers have used the surveys.
The Livingston Survey is the older 
of the two Philadelphia Fed surveys. 
It started when Joseph Livingston, 
a Philadelphia newspaper reporter, 
wanted to get a sense of what fore-
casters thought would happen to the 
economy in the next year, and so he 
began sending a survey to prominent 
2   Q3  2010 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
The Survey of Professional 
Forecasters began as the idea of 
Victor Zarnowitz and others at the 
American Statistical Association and 
the National Bureau of Economic 
Research. They began the ASA/
NBER Economic Outlook Survey in 
1968 and successfully carried it out 
for 22 years. The survey was similar 
to the Livingston Survey in that it 
asked private-sector forecasters for 
their projections for the next year for 
major macroeconomic variables. But 
the ASA/NBER survey was conducted 
more frequently than the Livingston 
Survey (quarterly instead of semi-
annually), asked for quarterly forecasts 
(instead of Livingston’s half-year 
forecasts), and included some unique 
questions about the probabilities of 
different outcomes, instead of asking 
just for the point forecasts (that is, the 
most likely outcome) reported by the 
Livingston Survey. In 1990, the ASA/
NBER turned the survey over to the 
Philadelphia Fed, which rechristened it 
the Survey of Professional Forecasters 
(SPF).3
Why do people need forecasts? 
When planning their personal 
budgets, people need to know what 
the forecast for inflation is; when 
planning production, firms need to 
forecast demand for their products; 
when buying and selling financial 
assets, investors need to forecast both 
inflation and future interest rates; 
and when setting policy, government 
analysts need to know how the 
economy is likely to fare in the future. 
Forecasting surveys can help all of 
these groups figure out the most likely 
outcomes for the variables that most 
concern them.
The Philadelphia Fed’s surveys 
are not the only surveys of forecast-
ers. A well-known U.S. survey is the 
Blue Chip Economic Indicators, which 
was started by Robert Eggert in 1976. 
The Blue Chip concept was to publish 
forecasts monthly (compared with the 
quarterly SPF and the semi-annual 
Livingston Survey) and to publish the 
names of each forecaster along with 
his or her forecast (forecasters for 
both the SPF and the Livingston were 
anonymous). In addition, the National 
Association for Business Economics 
(NABE) has produced a quarterly 
survey of forecasters since the early 
1960s, and the Wall Street Journal 
also conducts a similar survey that is 
reported in great detail on its website. 
Direct measurement of consumers’ 
inflation expectations is gathered by 
the monthly Reuters/University of 
Michigan survey of consumers, which 
asks a random sample of consumers for 
their forecasts of inflation. For other 
countries there have been a number of 
surveys, most notably Consensus Fore-
casts, which gathers detailed forecasts 
for all major developed countries in 
the world and less detailed forecasts 
for numerous other countries. Also, 
the European Central Bank started 
a European version of the Survey of 
Professional Forecasters in 1999 after 
consulting with the Philadelphia Fed 
on its methods.
The table on page 3 lists the major 
macroeconomic variables covered by 
the surveys, for which the respondents 
provide short-term forecasts (for the 
next one to two years). In addition 
to those variables, the surveys ask for 
long-term forecasts — the SPF asks 
about forecasts for inflation in both 
the CPI and PCE price index for the 
next five years and the next 10 years, 
while the Livingston Survey asks about 
real GDP growth and CPI inflation 
for the next 10 years. In addition, in 
every survey, the SPF asks about the 
probability of a decline in real GDP 
in each of the next five quarters and 
about the probability that real GDP, 
the inflation rate in the GDP price 
index, the CPI excluding food and 
energy, and the personal consump-
tion expenditures (PCE) price index 
excluding food and energy will fall into 
certain ranges. The latter questions are 
designed to get an idea of the degree of 
uncertainty that forecasters attach to 
their forecasts. Each survey also asks 
special questions from time to time on 
a variety of topics of current interest.
Both the SPF and the Livingston 
Survey provide anonymity for the 
forecasters. The survey news release 
lists the names of the forecasters, but 
a reader cannot tell which forecaster 
provided which forecast. The benefit 
of anonymity is that the forecasters 
 
3 For more on the setup of the Survey of 
Professional Forecasters and its origins, see my 
1993 article. The Philadelphia Fed’s website 
(at www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-
data/real-time-center/survey-of-professional-
forecasters/) contains background material 
about the survey, news releases from the survey 
going back to 1990, data files containing both 
forecasts of individuals and means or medians 
across the forecasters for each variable in 
each survey, an academic bibliography listing 
research papers that have used the survey, and 
forecast error statistics that present data on the 
accuracy of the survey forecasts.
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TABLE
Variables Included in the Surveys
Both Surveys
nominal gross domestic product (GDP) real (inflation-adjusted) GDP
unemployment rate inflation (consumer price index, CPI)
industrial production corporate profits after tax
business fixed investment housing starts
interest rate on three-month Treasury bills interest rate on 10-year Treasury notes
Livingston Survey
producer price index S&P 500 stock prices
average weekly earnings prime interest rate
retail trade sales auto sales
Survey of Professional Forecasters
interest rate on AAA bonds payroll employment
GDP price index consumer price index excluding food and energy prices
personal consumption expenditures price 
index
personal consumption expenditures price 
index excluding food and energy prices
consumption residential fixed investment
federal government spending state and local government spending
net exports changes in private inventories
may be more likely to reveal their true 
forecasts if they know that their name 
will not be associated with a particular 
forecast. If they think that their fore-
cast is very different from that of other 
forecasters, they would have no incen-
tive to hide it. However, if they were 
providing their forecasts in a nonanon-
ymous survey (such as the Wall Street 
Journal or the Blue Chip survey), they 
might prefer to shade their forecasts 
closer to the consensus, out of fear that 
they will be seen as being out of the 
mainstream. Other forecasters might 
be looking for attention and might in-
tentionally make their forecasts stand 
out from the crowd. The anonymity of 
the SPF and Livingston avoids these 
problems.4
The timing of the SPF and Liv-
ingston surveys differs, in part because 
the SPF is conducted four times each 
year, while the Livingston survey is 
conducted just twice a year. More im-
portant, since the SPF focuses on the 
national income accounts, the survey 
forms are sent to participants immedi-
ately following the initial release of the 
GDP data for the preceding quarter, 
which occurs in late January, April, 
July, and October each year. The 
forecasters are given about 10 days to 
4 In his study, Owen Lamont looked at a 
nonanonymous survey, finding that forecasters 
tended to distort their forecasts to manipulate 
their reputations, while Tom Stark’s study 
found no such evidence for the SPF, which is 
anonymous.
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respond to the survey questions, and 
they then e-mail their responses to the 
Philadelphia Fed before the middle of 
the following month (when key data 
on consumer prices are released). The 
Livingston Survey’s timing is based on 
the release of the consumer price index 
data in May and November, with the 
forecasts due before the next month’s 
release of the consumer price index.
EVALUATING THE SURVEY 
FORECASTS
Given the uses to which people, 
firms, and policymakers put the 
surveys, it is important that the 
forecasts be accurate. Of course, no 
forecast is going to be on the mark 
all the time.  Economists have tested 
the surveys extensively. Simple tests 
examine the forecast errors over time 
to see if they are zero, on average, 
which would be the hallmark of 
an unbiased forecast. Another test 
is how precise the forecast is, that 
is, how large the average error is. 
More sophisticated tests look at the 
correlation between forecast errors and 
information available to forecasters 
when they made their forecasts; if such 
a correlation exists, the forecasters 
in the survey are not using that 
information efficiently.
A visual inspection of the data 
sometimes suffices to see whether a 
particular forecast has forecast errors 
that are zero, on average. Figure 1 
shows a scatter plot in which the 
value of the inflation rate (based on 
the GDP deflator over a one-year 
period) is plotted on the vertical axis 
and the forecasts from the Livingston 
Survey for that year are plotted on 
the horizontal axis. The 45-degree 
line in the figure helps you gauge the 
accuracy of the forecasts because if 
the forecasts were perfect, every point 
in the diagram would be on that line. 
The fact that most of the points in 
the graph are close to the 45-degree 
line suggests that the forecasts are 
fairly accurate. Formal statistical 
tests confirm that the mean forecast 
error in this series is not statistically 
significantly different from zero.5 
Despite the unbiasedness of the survey 
forecasts over the entire period from 
the early 1970s to the mid-2000s, 
there are numerous periods in which 
the survey forecasts appear to have 
performed poorly. Figure 2 shows the 
actual values of inflation (measured 
using the GDP price index) over a one-
year period compared with the SPF 
forecasts for the corresponding period. 
The SPF forecasts for inflation 
were clearly far from the mark in 
the early and late 1970s, with very 
large forecast errors. Perhaps these 
forecast errors were understandable, 
given the unprecedented increase in 
the growth of the money supply that 
occurred during that decade, which 
caught forecasters by surprise. In the 
early 1980s, the forecasts were wrong 
in the opposite direction, as inflation 
fell much more than the forecasters 
thought it would. Similarly, in most 
of the 1990s, the forecasters made a 
string of forecast errors, with inflation 
continually coming in lower than 
the forecasters had projected. In that 
period, productivity growth surged, 
and it took some time before the 
forecasters realized that the economy 
was not overheating, but rather that 
potential output was increasing more 
rapidly than before, so inflation would 
not be rising significantly.6 Thus, the 
forecasters clearly go through periods 
in which they make persistent forecast 
errors. 
In addition to periods in which 
the forecasters make persistent forecast 
errors, the forecasters in the surveys 
may be inefficient in their use of other 
information. Economists test this idea 
by examining the relationship between 
the survey’s forecast errors and data 
that were known when the forecasters 
made their forecasts. For example, 
Laurence Ball and I found that output 
forecast errors were associated with 
changes in the real (inflation-adjusted) 
federal funds rate (the interest rate 
on short-term loans between banks, 
which is the Federal Reserve’s main 
policy instrument), which means that 
the forecasters did not accurately 
modify their forecasts in response to 
a change in monetary policy. This 
can be seen in Figure 3, which plots 
the output forecast error from the 
SPF (the actual rate of output growth 
minus the forecasted rate of output 
growth) against the lagged change 
in the real federal funds rate. The 
negative relationship between these 
two variables implies that the output 
forecasts from the SPF are not efficient 
with respect to changes in monetary 
policy. 
A little-explored aspect of the SPF 
is the probability distribution forecasts 
it provides. Each forecaster is asked 
to list the probability that real GDP 
growth and inflation in the GDP price 
index will fall into certain ranges. In 
the most recent surveys, the forecasters 
are asked to state the probability that 
real GDP growth in the next year 
will be 6 percent or more, 5.0 to 5.9 
percent, 4.0 to 4.9 percent, 3.0 to
3.9 percent, 2.0 to 2.9 percent, 1.0
to 1.9 percent, 0.0 to 0.9 percent, -1.0
to -0.1 percent, -2.0 to -1.1 percent, 
and -2.0 percent or less. The same 
question is also asked for real GDP 
growth in the following year. For the 
percent change in the GDP price 
index, the ranges are two percentage 
points higher, so the top range is 8 
percent or more, and so on.
5 See my 2010 paper.
6 These concepts are explored in more detail in 
my 2010 paper. 
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Forecasts Versus Actuals: Livingston Survey
FIGURE 1
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FIGURE 2
Frank Diebold, Anthony Tay, 
and Kenneth Wallis analyzed these 
probability distribution forecasts from 
the SPF using new methods. Their 
goal was to test the accuracy of the 
distribution forecasts, and for the most 
part, they found that the forecasts 
were reasonably accurate. However, 
the forecasts failed to pass some tests: 
(1) they placed too large a probability 
on a large decline in inflation; and 
(2) they made persistent inflation 
forecast errors, though the forecasters 
eventually adapted and the errors 
disappeared. They also found that 
when inflation was low, uncertainty 
about inflation was also low. 
Overall, recent research on the 
accuracy of the SPF and Livingston 
forecasts has found that they are 
reasonable, even if there are a few 
areas in which they are imperfect. 
However, as the literature using the 
surveys for research evolved over time, 
the accuracy of the forecasts was often 
called into question.
USING THE SURVEYS 
TO ANSWER RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS
We now turn to a discussion 
about the areas of research in which 
researchers have used the SPF and 
Livingston Survey.  These include 
investigating whether people have 
rational expectations, studying how 
people form their expectations, 
conducting empirical studies of 
macroeconomic theories, and 
7 This section discusses many of the major 
research studies that have used the surveys. 
For a more complete list of such studies, see 
the bibliographies posted on the Philadelphia 
Fed’s website at www.philadelphiafed.org/
research-and-data/real-time-center/survey-of-
professional-forecasters/academic-bibliography.
cfm and www.philadelphiafed.org/research-
and-data/real-time-center/livingston-survey/
academic-bibliography.cfm.
15
10
5
0
Actual (percent)
Forecast (percent)
50 10 15
14
8
4
6
0
02
12
Percent
Date
Actual
Forecast
10
1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006
Date
8
2
-2
0
-4
4
6
Percent
Forecast Error
1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006
6   Q3  2010 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
answering questions about monetary 
policy.7
Economists have written major 
research papers using both the SPF 
and Livingston surveys, beginning with 
Stephen Turnovsky. Turnovsky tried 
to show how forecasters formed their 
expectations, and he developed an 
early test of rationality of the forecasts 
using the Livingston Survey. The 
first paper to use the SPF (actually its 
predecessor, the ASA/NBER survey) 
was one by Vincent Su and Josephine 
Su, which evaluated the accuracy of 
the survey forecasts using only a few 
years of data.
None of the earliest papers to use 
the Livingston Survey are reliable, 
however, because John Carlson 
discovered a major flaw in the data 
(which has subsequently been fixed). 
Because the survey’s original purpose 
was for journalism, Livingston did 
not report the actual forecasts of the 
forecasters in his newspaper column. 
Instead, he modified the forecast 
data if a data release occurred after 
the forecasters had submitted their 
forecasts but before his newspaper 
column appeared and if the data 
release would have changed the overall 
nature of the forecasts.
Carlson gives the following ex-
ample. Suppose the CPI was released 
in September and October with a 
value of 121.1 and the forecasters have 
an average forecast for the following 
June of 121.2. Then, if the November 
data release (which came out after the 
forecasters had answered the survey 
but before the survey results were 
reported) for the CPI is 121.1, the June 
forecast is reasonable and Livingston 
would not adjust the forecast. But 
suppose the November CPI data were 
released as 121.6. Then if Livingston 
reported the November number and 
the June forecast, it would appear that 
the forecasters thought there would be 
deflation, even though they were really 
forecasting a small amount of inflation. 
So, Livingston would instead report a 
forecast of 121.7, which maintains the 
0.1 increase in the CPI that the fore-
casters thought would happen. But this 
means that the reported forecasts were 
fictional and depended on Livingston’s 
personal judgment. Carlson remedied 
this situation by obtaining the true 
forecast values from Livingston and 
thus restoring the integrity of the data 
set. Carlson showed that Livingston’s 
adjustments made the forecasts look 
better. Studies based on the incor-
rect data obtained somewhat different 
results compared with results based on 
the corrected data.  
Rational Expectations. The 
Philadelphia Fed’s surveys of 
forecasters were initially used by 
researchers in the early 1970s to 
investigate the concept of rational 
expectations, which asserts that 
people do not make systematic errors 
in forecasting. A number of early 
papers had used the Livingston Survey 
forecasts of inflation and rejected 
the rational expectations hypothesis 
because researchers found that the 
survey forecasts were biased (with 
a nonzero mean forecast error) and 
inefficient (because the forecast errors 
were correlated with data known when 
the survey was taken). 
But in a 1978 study, Donald 
Mullineaux found a major flaw in the 
statistical procedure previous studies 
had used to test for and reject the 
rationality of expected inflation in 
the Livingston Survey.8 Mullineaux 
then proposed a new test that is not 
Output Forecast Errors and Change in
Real Fed Funds Rate
FIGURE 3
8 The flaw is that the test used in much previous 
work (known as the Chow test) assumed identi-
cally and independently distributed (i.i.d.) errors 
in a framework where that is unlikely to hold. 
Mullineaux showed that the assumption can be 
rejected.
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
-8
-8
Output Forecast Error
Change in Real Federal Funds Rate
-6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
Business Review  Q3  2010   7www.philadelphiafed.org
subject to the same statistical problem 
and found that the properly specified 
data are consistent with people having 
rational expectations.
The early literature on rational 
expectations often ran tests for 
unbiasedness and inefficiency of the 
survey forecasts. But those tests were 
flawed in an important way because 
they failed to account for the fact 
that a forecast error in one survey 
forecast carried over to other surveys 
because the length of the forecast 
horizon (eight or 14 months) was 
longer than the interval between 
surveys (six months). Thus, a sudden 
rise in inflation in one period could 
lead to forecast errors in two or three 
consecutive surveys, a situation 
that has come to be known as the 
overlapping observations problem.
By failing to account for this 
correlation in the forecast errors, the 
researchers’ tests for unbiasedness and 
inefficiency were overstating the case 
against the surveys. Bryan Brown and 
Shlomo Maital finally remedied this 
situation, making a key methodological 
contribution: recognizing the 
overlapping-observations problem and 
showing how to adjust the statistical 
tests so that they gave the correct 
inference. Brown and Maital then 
tested the Livingston Survey data for 
unbiasedness and efficiency. They 
generally found no bias, unlike many 
earlier researchers. But they did find 
some evidence that the Livingston 
Survey forecast errors were correlated 
with changes in money growth.9
Another challenge to rational 
expectations using the surveys came 
from Eugene Fama and Michael 
Gibbons. They created alternative 
inflation forecasts based on nominal 
and real interest rates, as well as 
changes in those rates. They showed 
that the inflation forecasts based 
on interest rates outperformed the 
Livingston Survey forecasts of inflation 
from 1977 to 1982. 
Many other researchers became 
convinced that forecasters did not 
have rational expectations. One of 
them, Douglas Pearce, did a simple 
experiment to show how irrational 
the survey forecasts were. Pearce then 
constructed a forecast of inflation in 
which the change in the inflation rate 
from one period to the next depended 
only on the unexpected change in the 
inflation rate in the previous period 
and ignored data on other variables 
that a forecaster might use to fore-
cast, including the money supply and 
the strength of the economy. Pearce 
correctly used only the data that the 
participants in the Livingston Survey 
had available to them at the time when 
they made their forecasts (known as 
real-time data; see the study that I did 
with Tom Stark for more on this con-
cept of real-time data analysis). Pearce 
compared his simple model’s forecasts 
with the forecasts from the Livingston 
Survey and found that his model had 
much better forecasts for inflation than 
the survey. He also showed that the 
rise in interest rates in the 1970s was 
better explained by his simple model 
than by the Livingston Survey. 
If a very simple model can provide 
better forecasts than the forecasters in 
the survey, it would seem that the sur-
vey forecasts aren’t that valuable, and 
professional forecasters are irrational 
because they could have used Pearce’s 
model and made better forecasts.10
After many studies that found 
fault with the forecasting surveys, 
many economists began to believe that 
either people did not have rational 
expectations or that the surveys did 
not represent people’s true forecasts, 
or both. Michael Keane and David 
Runkle sought to disprove both 
hypotheses, arguing that much of the 
literature on testing survey forecasts 
for rationality suffered from three 
flaws: (1) the use of the average 
forecast across forecasters was wrong 
because forecasters may have different 
information; (2) other research 
studies failed to adjust properly for 
data revisions; and (3) other research 
studies failed to account for the 
correlation of forecast errors across 
forecasters. Keane and Runkle avoided 
these problems by using individual 
forecasts on the GNP deflator, basing 
their analysis on real-time data (the 
first revision of the national income 
data, which come out one month after 
the initial release), and developing a 
statistical method that accounts for 
the correlation of forecast errors across 
forecasters. They evaluated current-
quarter inflation forecasts from the 
SPF, finding that they were unbiased 
and efficient.
Overall, the literature on rational 
expectations has benefited tremen-
dously from the existence of the SPF 
and the Livingston Survey. Though 
the results of tests for rationality have 
been mixed over time, more recent 
evaluations generally suggest that the 
survey forecasts are fairly accurate 
and pass most, though not all, tests for 
rationality.
Expectations Formation. Research 
on how people form expectations 
has a slightly different goal than the 
literature on testing rational expecta-
tions; it uses the surveys to investigate 
what information forecasters use to 
form their forecasts and the properties 
of their forecasts.  
9 A related correlation is found in my paper with 
Laurence Ball.
10 Later research showed that Pearce’s results, 
though powerful, weakened over time. If 
you use the same method that Pearce used 
and the additional data that we have today, 
you would find that the survey now does 
better than the simple model that Pearce 
used. See my 2010 paper for an extensive 
analysis of the use of Pearce’s method.
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Alex Cukierman and Paul 
Wachtel introduced the idea that 
inflation expectations differ across 
individuals because people have 
different information at their disposal. 
In this situation, an increase in 
people’s uncertainty about inflation 
leads to more variability in their 
inflation expectations over time 
than when inflation is more stable. 
Cukierman and Wachtel used the 
Livingston Survey forecasts on CPI 
inflation to examine the differences 
in inflation expectations across 
forecasters. They found that the 
variability of expected inflation across 
forecasters is positively related to the 
variability of the inflation rate and 
the growth rate of the economy’s 
output. Thus, volatility in the economy 
translates into uncertainty in people’s 
forecasts. 
One branch of this literature is 
devoted to finding variables that are 
correlated with the survey forecasts, 
thus revealing the data that forecasters 
find important in forming their 
forecasts. In a 1980 study, Donald 
Mullineaux used the Livingston Survey 
forecasts to examine how forecasters 
form inflation expectations, using 
real-time data on the money supply 
(that is, the data known to forecasters 
when they made their forecasts, rather 
than revised data). He found that the 
forecasters used money-growth data 
in forming their forecasts, not just 
lagged inflation data, so that inflation 
forecasting models that are just 
based on past inflation rates are not 
efficient. Mullineaux found evidence 
that the expectations-formation 
process changed over time, perhaps 
in response to changes in the way 
monetary policy was conducted.
This is an important finding, 
since it provides evidence that is 
consistent with theoretical research by 
Nobel Prize winner Robert Lucas, who 
argued that when the Federal Reserve 
changes the process by which it sets 
monetary policy (a process that clearly 
changed in the 1970s), equations such 
as those describing the formation of 
inflation expectations will undergo 
significant changes. Mullineaux also 
found evidence that the same model 
determining inflation expectations 
also determines actual inflation, so 
that survey forecasts are rational.
One of the most important papers 
in this literature is that of Victor Zar-
nowitz and Louis Lambros, who were 
the first to combine and compare the 
SPF point forecasts with the probabil-
ity distribution forecasts.11 They con-
sidered two concepts: (1) consensus, 
which is the degree to which the point 
forecasts are similar across forecasters; 
and (2) uncertainty, which is the de-
gree to which an individual forecaster 
thinks a certain outcome is likely and 
is a measure of how much risk there is 
to her or his point forecast. Zarnowitz 
and Lambros found that consensus 
across forecasters may be very different 
from the uncertainty that each indi-
vidual forecaster has about his or her 
forecast. Previously, most researchers 
had equated consensus and uncer-
tainty, which had the effect of under-
stating the true degree of uncertainty. 
Zarnowitz and Lambros also found 
that higher inflation rates were associ-
ated with greater uncertainty about 
inflation and showed that increased 
inflation uncertainty was associated 
with lower real output growth.
Recently, numerous researchers 
have begun focusing on how 
households form their own inflation 
expectations. Gregory Mankiw, 
Ricardo Reis, and Justin Wolfers noted 
that professional forecasters disagree 
with each other in their forecasts 
of inflation, as do consumers. They 
showed that the extent to which 
forecasters disagree changes over 
time. To explain these disagreements, 
they developed a “sticky-information” 
model. The basic idea of sticky 
information is that collecting and 
analyzing information involves 
costs, so that people update their 
expectations infrequently. They 
then used the Michigan survey 
of consumers, the SPF, and the 
Livingston Survey to verify their 
model. They found that their model 
helps to explain the irrationality of 
inflation expectations, including why 
forecast errors are persistent and why 
it takes some time before news is 
incorporated into the forecasts. 
A related paper is that of 
Christopher Carroll, who developed 
an interesting hypothesis:  Households 
may not have rational expectations, 
but rather form their expectations by 
reading professional forecasts, which 
are rational. (See How Would You 
Forecast?) Households’ expectations 
may not be rational because they 
only occasionally read the forecasts 
of professional forecasters and don’t 
always pay attention to them. To 
test this view, Carroll examined 
whether the forecasts in the Michigan 
survey of consumers incorporate 
information from the SPF, or vice 
versa. By examining the relationship 
between the actual inflation rate, the 
Michigan consumer survey forecasts, 
and the SPF forecasts of inflation, he 
was able to show that the Michigan 
forecast contains no additional 
information that is not already in 
the SPF, but the SPF does contain 
additional information that is not in 
the Michigan survey. He also found 
evidence that SPF forecasts affected 
11 The difference between a point forecast and a 
probability distribution forecast can be illustrat-
ed by an example. The survey’s point forecast 
for inflation in the next year could be 2.5 per-
cent. The probability distribution forecast might 
be a 25 percent chance that inflation will be 1.0 
to 1.9 percent, a 50 percent chance that infla-
tion will be 2.0 to 2.9 percent, and a 25 percent 
chance that inflation will be 3.0 to 3.9 percent.
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How Would You Forecast?
I f you were asked to forecast the economy, how would you do it? You might say, “I am not in the business of forecasting, so I don’t know how I would construct 
forecasts of the economy!” But it turns 
out that most of us have some intuition 
about how the economy is going to fare in the future. For 
example, the Michigan survey of consumers asks people 
who are not economists what they think the inflation 
rate will be over the coming year, and the consumers 
answer the question very well, in some periods forecasting 
inflation better than the professional economists in the 
Livingston Survey and the SPF.
One thing you could do is to look at recent values 
and assume that the future will be just like today. Or 
you might take a class at your local university and learn 
techniques of time-series forecasting, which would be far 
more sophisticated than assuming the future is like today 
and would give you much better forecasts. But most of us 
do not want to spend that much time to forecast for three 
good reasons: (1) the costs of forecasting are high because 
most of us do not know much about forecasting; (2) the 
benefits of forecasting are low because our lives are not 
strongly affected by being able to forecast better; and (3) 
we can read the newspaper or surf the web and easily 
learn about the forecasts of experts, so why should we 
bother to make our own?
As our discussion in the text of Christopher Carroll’s 
research suggests, most people do not spend much time 
forecasting, but they do read about forecasts in the 
media and on the Internet. As a result, the forecasts of 
experts are distributed around the country gradually over 
time. Thus, even though only a few economic experts 
take the time to work out their own forecasts, their 
views influence the forecasts of many citizens and thus 
affect economic activity. A further reason to turn to a 
survey like the Survey of Professional Forecasters or the 
Livingston is that the surveys combine the efforts of a 
number of forecasters who often look at the economy 
from different perspectives. As a result, a forecast that 
averages all of the projections (using the mean or the 
median) is often superior to any individual forecast.*
*There is a substantial amount of research in the area of forecast combination, which shows that simple averages of many forecasts often perform 
better than nearly all individual forecasts. See Alan Timmermann’s article for an overview. 
 
later Michigan surveys but that the 
Michigan survey did not affect later 
SPF forecasts. This result suggests 
that, over time, households come to 
incorporate the SPF forecasts. Carroll’s 
results are also supported by the fact 
that when news coverage of inflation 
is high, Michigan forecasts get closer 
to SPF forecasts. Similar results occur 
when Carroll uses the unemployment 
rate in his empirical work, rather than 
the inflation rate.
Empirical Macroeconomics. 
One puzzle that survey forecasts 
helped solve was the issue of why 
real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates 
declined so much in the 1970s. James 
Wilcox used the Livingston Survey 
forecasts of inflation in an attempt to 
determine the main factors affecting 
nominal and real interest rates. He 
discovered that much of the decline 
in real interest rates in the 1970s 
(though not all) was due to increases 
in expected inflation rates. He argued 
that previous models failed to include 
a supply-shock variable representing 
the prices on inputs, such as oil prices. 
Once he included such a variable and 
used the Livingston Survey forecasts 
to represent expected inflation in 
calculating the real interest rate, his 
model fit the data well. In a related 
paper, Kajal Lahiri, Christie Tiegland, 
and Mark Zaporowski found that 
uncertainty about inflation (measured 
using the probability variables in the 
SPF) also affected real interest rates. 
Their main result was that increased 
uncertainty about inflation causes 
the real interest rate to decline, with 
investment spending declining more 
than saving.
One of the most famous papers 
that empirically tests macroeconomic 
theory was that of Robert Hall, who 
found evidence supporting economists’ 
major theory of consumption, which 
is that income in a given year has 
less impact on consumption spending 
than households’ long-run average 
income, a theory known as the life-
cycle/permanent-income hypothesis. 
Hall used the Livingston Survey to 
calculate the expected inflation rate 
and the expected return to the stock 
market. He also found that changes in 
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the real interest rate have little effect 
on consumption spending, much less 
than some economists had thought 
before Hall’s research.
This discussion only touches 
on some of the main studies in the 
empirical macroeconomics literature 
that have benefited from the 
Philadelphia Fed’s surveys.
Monetary Policy. One of 
the main mechanisms by which 
monetary policy affects the economy 
is by affecting people’s inflation 
expectations. Researchers have 
suggested that the Federal Reserve 
bases monetary policy on inflation 
and the degree to which output 
in the economy is above or below 
trend (known as the output gap). 
The equation relating the federal 
funds interest rate (which measures 
monetary policy) to inflation and the 
output gap is known as the Taylor rule, 
named after John Taylor of Stanford 
University, who developed the idea. 
Most of the research done in this area 
suggests that the Fed looks at past 
inflation and the past output gap. 
But Athanasios Orphanides used the 
SPF to obtain forecasts of inflation 
and output to use in the Taylor rule 
and found that this produced better 
estimates of what the Fed did than 
using past data. Thus, the Fed appears 
to follow a forward-looking Taylor rule 
rather than a backward-looking rule.
How does the Fed respond to 
changes in expected inflation? Sylvain 
Leduc, Keith Sill, and Tom Stark 
investigated this issue, using the 
Livingston Survey as a source for the 
economy’s expected inflation rate. 
They found that before 1979, the Fed 
responded to increases in expected 
inflation by increasing the federal 
funds interest rate. But because the 
Fed did not increase the interest rate 
by as much as expected inflation 
increased, the real interest rate 
declined.  This more accommodative 
monetary policy was followed by higher 
inflation, and the authors concluded 
that monetary policy contributed 
to the rise in inflation in the 1970s. 
However, after 1979, the Fed did the 
opposite, tightening monetary policy 
when expected inflation increased, 
thus raising the real interest rate and 
reducing future inflation.
Other Important Research 
Results. One key question about the 
data that are issued by government 
statistical agencies is whether data 
revisions are forecastable or not. Knut 
Mork sought to answer that question 
using the SPF survey as a measure of 
information known at the time the 
government releases its initial GDP 
data. He found that GDP revisions 
were correlated with the SPF forecast 
of GDP, and thus the revisions were 
forecastable, which means that the 
government’s initial data releases are 
not efficient and could be improved.
Some economists have also 
used the Philadelphia Fed surveys to 
investigate a hypothesis in financial 
economics. Steven Sharpe related the 
SPF forecasts of one-year inflation 
rates and 10-year inflation rates to 
stock returns, finding that a one-
percentage-point rise in the long-term 
expected inflation rate implies a 20 
percent reduction in stock prices. Sean 
Campbell and Frank Diebold showed 
that the Livingston Survey could be 
used to predict stock returns, with 
stronger economic growth related to 
lower stock returns, and vice versa. 
The surveys have also been 
used to investigate optimal methods 
of forecasting. Andrew Ang, Geert 
Bekaert, and Min Wei compared 
inflation forecasts from the Livingston 
Survey, SPF, and the Michigan survey 
of consumers. They found that the 
surveys forecast inflation better than 
do a number of other forecasting 
models that economists use. They also 
found that the Michigan forecasts are 
only slightly worse than the SPF and 
Livingston forecasts but still do better 
than the other forecasting methods.
SUMMARY 
There can be little doubt that 
the Philadelphia Fed’s surveys 
of forecasters have played an 
instrumental role in economic research 
in the past 40 years. The surveys have 
been used to test rational-expectations 
theory, to analyze the formation of 
inflation expectations, to conduct 
empirical research in macroeconomics, 
and to investigate the formation and 
impact of monetary policy, and they 
have been used in a variety of other 
studies as well. BR  
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